During the 19 th century, the US birthrate fell by half. While previous economic literature has emphasized demand-side explanations for this decline-that rising land prices and literacy caused a decrease in demand for children-historians and others have
Introduction
At the start of the 19 th century, the US birthrate was among the highest in the world. During the 1800s, however, the US experienced one of the world's largest decline in fertility. Total female fertility dropped from seven children per woman in 1800 to less than four per woman at the end of the 19 th century (Degler 1980) . This drop is referred to as the 19 th Century Demographic Transition. Economic and demographic studies have largely focused on the demand-side for fertility control during this transition. Why were people demanding smaller families during this time period?
The demand hypotheses that have found the most support in the literature are the land availability hypothesis (Degler 1980 , Easterlin 1971 , 1976a , 1976b , Forster and Tucker 1972 , Haines and Guest 2008 , and Yasuba 1962 and the related bequest hypothesis (Carter et al. 2004 , Easterlin, Alter and Condran 1978 , Haines 1987 Steckel 1992 , Sundstrom and David 1988 . There is a negative correlation between child-woman ratios and population density at the state level (Yasuba 1962 ) and the county level (Forster and Tucker 1972) . Easterlin presents a sociological hypothesis that the reason for this correlation is that parents, wanting to divide their property equally between their heirs, would rather keep their children close than send them West where land was cheaper, and thus have fewer children (Easterlin 1976a) . Haines and Hacker (2006) argue that parents wanted this proximity as a form of old-age insurance. However, this is more of a motivation for parents to keep the most productive children nearby than to keep all of them. In addition, in the tradition of primogeniture that British settlers brought to the early United States, there was no need to divide up land among heirs (Easterlin 1976b) . Nonetheless, Steckel (1992) finds that the strongest predictive variables for fertility were financial institutions and labor market structures, and Carter et al. (2004) and Sundstrom and David (1988) suggest that the land-availability hypothesis does poorly in the South is because slaves provided a version of old-age insurance. Carter et al (2004) presents and excellent analysis of these literatures.
There is also some support in the literature for the increased education hypothesis (Degler 1980 , Easterlin 1976b , McLaren 1990 , Reed 1978 . Easterlin (1976b) finds a small negative correlation between literacy of parents and fertility rates among farm families, although Carter et al. (2004) find mixed results of literacy and education on fertility. McLaren (1990) and Degler (1980) report that literate wives had lower fertility than did illiterate wives married to men of the same class. Education may change attitudes towards fertility and raise the cost of children by increasing women's income potential. A similar hypothesis is the "outside opportunities for women" hypothesis. In this hypothesis, women are attracted to paid employment at the expense of childbearing.
However, differences in fertility rates are found even between more and less densely populated rural areas in the 19 th century, where education and literacy levels were high for all women and there were very few employment opportunities outside of the "farmwife" role. Therefore these hypotheses cannot entirely explain the decrease in fertility rates (Easterlin 1976a) .
Other hypotheses that have not found as much support include the child labor hypothesis and the burden of aged dependents hypothesis. As the US industrialized, child labor was less useful than it had been in an agricultural economy (Gordon 1976).
Again, examining fertility differences among agricultural areas finds that fertility was actually higher in areas where child labor was less useful (Easterlin 1976a) . Therefore this hypothesis cannot explain the entire decline. Similarly, little evidence has been found to support the idea that families in newer areas were less likely to be supporting aging relatives. Perhaps the most convincing argument against this explanation is Easterlin's (1976a) assertion that there were not enough aged persons relative to primeaged working adults to account for any differences in fertility.
Early economics theories also touched on fertility control as a side-effect of delayed marriage or increased breast-feeding (Degler 1980 , Reed 1978 , Sanderson 1979 , Wahl 1986 ). Although these methods may have been in part responsible for some of the earlier, 18 th -century, demographic transition, especially in France, they cannot explain all of the increase in child spacing or the termination of childbearing within marriage before a woman's fertile years had ended. Easterlin (1976b) provides a summary of the evidence that marital fertility limitation was more important than delayed marriage in the 19 th -century U.S. demographic transition (c.f. Degler 1980 , Reed 1978 . These and other hypotheses are discussed in greater detail by Easterlin (1976a Easterlin ( , 1976b , and Haines and Hacker (2006) . Similarly, urbanization and industrialization have been cited as sources of lower fertility, but the drop precedes the greater part of these phenomena, and the drop in the rural birth rate matched that of the urban birth rate (Degler 1980 , Reed 1978 .
Outside of the field of economics, the supply side of fertility control technology has been explored more thoroughly. Historians, using letters and other print evidence, have pointed out that there has always been a demand for fertility control (Degler 1980 , Mohr 1978 , but the 19 th century provided information and access to abortion and birth control through word of mouth, print literature, lecture tours, and the new catalogue market (Brodie 1994 , Mohr 1978 , Scott Smith 1973 , Smith-Rosenberg 1985 This paper argues that information transfer and innovation can help explain the correlations that have been found between fertility rates and land prices (which are directly related to population density), between fertility rates and railroadization (Carter et al. 2004 and the author's calculations), and between fertility rates and literacy rates.
Higher population density means that women can communicate different birth control techniques to each other, and that there is a market to support midwife and abortion services. Places with a large enough population center might also be included on the lecture circuit, which grew dramatically over this period (Degler 1980) . Population density is also tied to canals and railroadization, which facilitated the circulation of paper information in the form of newspapers, advertisements, mail-order services, pamphlets, and books. Higher literacy rates allow people to digest the flow of information.
Furthermore, this paper shows that fertility rates are higher in states and times when access to this technology has been cut off by restrictive state laws. When the costs of obtaining fertility control are higher, people will not limit their fertility as easily as when costs are lower, even when demand for fertility control does not change.
Therefore, the fertility ratio will be higher in areas where access to products and information has been cut off by legislative action. This paper's estimates that abortion restrictions led to an 3-11% increase in births are strikingly similar to results on the effects of limited abortion access for modern populations (cf. Levine et al. 1999, Angrist and Evans 1999) .
The value added to recent discussions of fertility control by the approach of examining the 19 th century is twofold. First, identification of effects is easier-fertility has been completed, so regressions do not need to censor for potential future children.
Moreover, laws changed over a long period of time rather than providing, as in the case of 1970s abortion legalization, just a few years of differences between states (in addition, higher travel costs make contamination between states less of an issue). Second, the long period since these law changes means that full lifecycle effects on the cohorts of children born to women who had more versus less fertility control can be observed. These effects include not only education, marriage, and childbearing, but even longevity and mortality.
Background
Nineteenth-century women seeking to abort often used herbal remedies before resorting to surgical ones. Some of these herbs, such as cotton root or black or blue cohosh, were effective abortifacients if used early in the pregnancy, and some herbs made women ill enough that their bodies aborted on their own. Other herbal remedies were not actually abortifacients, but emenogogues that did help regulate menstrual cycles and so gave the appearance of being effective abortifacients. Others were purgatives, causing illness and intestinal problems, or were harmless but useless. These remedies were widely advertised and available through mail order until changes in the legal environment in the latter part of the 19 th century made them more difficult to obtain (Brodie 1994, King 1992 , Smith-Rosenberg 1985 .
As in the early to mid 20 th century, membrane rupture through the use of metal rods (knitting needles and crochet hooks are reported to have been popular) or sharp sticks was a common surgical method of abortion used by "irregular" abortionists and women themselves. Once the membrane was ruptured, the body would expel the fetus on its own. This method was very dangerous and could easily injure the woman's internal organs if performed incorrectly.
Dilation and cutterage, though invented in ancient Greece, was only reintroduced to the Western world in the 1840s; it became prominent among regular physicians sometime in the 1860s or 1870s (King 1992) . This method first dilates the cervix, then uses surgical tools to scrape fetal tissue out of the uterus. It is still common today, but must be performed with the appropriate tools. Although thought to be safer and more effective than membrane rupture when performed by a trained professional, it can still lead to infection.
It is not known whether abortion or childbirth was the more dangerous option during the 19 th century (King 1992) . 3 Observers from that time period have made the claim in either direction depending on their agenda (King 1992) , and scattered statistics also point in either direction (Degler 1980 , Gordon 1976 , Mohr 1978 , Tribe 1990 (Loudon 1993) . Hospital births did not really become "safe" until the 1940s
with the invention of sulpha drugs (McLaren 1990) . The germ theory of disease and the spread of dilation and cutterage may have made surgical abortions safer, if performed by trained professionals with the appropriate tools. However, the legal environment that this paper exploits made these safer abortions difficult to obtain in the second half of the 19 th century.
Doctors began to notice an increase in abortions in the late 1830s and 1840s (Degler 1980 , McLaren 1990 . The most famous abortionist, New York City's Madame
Restell, began her practice in 1838. Abortions early in the century were generally sought by poor, unmarried women. The increase in professional abortions, however, drew from the married middle-class (Degler 1980 , Mohr 1978 , Reagan 1991 . Two thirds of abortion cases cited in the medical journals in the second half of the 19 th century were of married women (Mohr 1978) . Mohr (1978) and Scott Smith (1971) and a 6 percent mortality rate (Gordon 1976 , Smith-Rosenberg 1985 . Gordon (1976) suggests that earlier estimates of the number of abortions were understated and the death rates overstated because successful abortions were undercounted by contemporaries. On the other hand, David and Sanderson (1986) argue that these numbers are overestimates because they underestimate the natural rate of miscarriage. However, Sanderson (1979) suggests that somewhat under half of all births averted by ever married women were averted through induced abortion rather than birth control.
The 19 th century U.S. saw many major changes besides declining fertility rates.
Transaction costs were decreasing-in modern parlance, the world was getting "flatter."
The United States was undergoing an early information revolution: as railroads spread across the country, mass production and distribution became a reality, and the growth of printing presses, combined with faster transportation and mass literacy, allowed for more information transfer (Smith-Rosenberg 1985) . The Second Industrial Revolution brought significant changes in economic organization and modes of production. All these changes, however, were gradual, in contrast to the sharp changes that occurred within states when abortion restrictions were enacted.
History of abortion laws
Early abortion laws, beginning in the 1830s and 1840s, were some of the first instances of malpractice laws. They regulated who could legally give abortions and punished unlawful abortionists, especially if the woman died, but they did not punish women seeking abortions (Brodie 1994) . Traditionally under British common law, abortions before "quickening," when the woman could feel movement, were not considered immoral both because the fetus was generally not thought to be alive at that point and because proving pregnancy before quickening was difficult (Degler 1980 , Gordon 1976 , King 1992 . During this time period, many state supreme courts ruled that abortion before quickening was not a criminal offense (Brodie 1994) . Moreover, many of the early state abortion laws were the result of automatic criminal code revisions and
were not well publicized (Brodie 1994) . Many others were parts of omnibus laws protecting consumers from dangerous poisons or protecting women in general (Degler 1980 , Lader 1966 , Polsky 1970 ).
In 1860s through 1880s, however, states began to pass more restrictive antiabortion laws that outlawed advertisements, closed loopholes, and made women liable for seeking an abortion. Many of these laws also prohibited abortions before "quickening."
Unlike previous laws, these laws specifically focused on preventing abortion and were not part of omnibus law changes as the earlier laws had been (Degler 1980) . Although the courts were often sympathetic to women and abortionists, the publicity and questioning during a trial could permanently tarnish a reputation and in many cases the official investigations and court trials amounted to harassment (Reagan 1991) .
Social Movements Towards Restriction
There are many theories as to why the more restrictive abortion laws were passed after the 1860s. The American Medical Association (AMA) was the leading force behind anti-abortion legislation. The leading theory on the subject, put forth by Mohr (1978) and taken up by many others (Brodie 1994 , King 1992 , is that the fledgling AMA used abortion as a focal point in its fight to distinguish its doctors from quacks and other "irregulars." One argument made by some historians is that the AMA had originally tried to use prostitution regulation as their core issue but that effort had failed dramatically and lent strength to their opponents. Abortion better served their purpose (Reed 1978) . A similar but less Machiavellian explanation for the actions of the AMA is that regular doctors believed that the Hippocratic oath disallowed abortions and did not want others practicing abortions (and, in addition, possibly stealing patients) if they could not (Mohr 1978) . Another, less mainstream, theory of AMA involvement suggests that through advancing medical technology of the time, doctors had a better understanding of conception and gestation and viewed fetal growth as a continuous process, rather than one in which life was infused at "quickening," or when the mother could first feel movement (generally around 18-20 weeks) (Degler 1980). Reed (1978) suggests that physicians saw each abortion as a lost potential paying customer, especially as well-off middle class women began to be the primary recipients of abortions.
Some feminist historians emphasize that the leaders in both the anti-abortion and anti-birth control movements, such as Storer and Comstock, were themselves infertile.
Recent modern evidence that legislators who are also fathers are more likely to favor abortion rights if they have daughters (Washington 2008 ) lends plausibility to the argument that 19 th -century views on abortion were affected by such personal characteristics-that "the personal is political." A final argument is that since white, middle class women were practicing family limitation in greater numbers, middle class white men (which included the members of the AMA) were worried about immigrants and other undesirables populating the country (Smith-Rosenberg 1985) .
Data

Abortion Laws
A number of secondary sources exist describing abortion laws. Contemporary activists from both sides of the abortion debate provided snapshots of the laws as they existed at the time. Additionally, historians have compiled lists of these laws for various time periods, and legal scholars have discussed specific laws in depth. To identify all state laws regulating abortion, I compiled and compared these secondary sources. In cases where there was a disagreement between sources, the original laws were obtained from the Harvard Law Library's microfiche of superceded state statutes.
In addition to the existence of the law, various characteristics of these laws were coded. These include laws regarding: obscene supplies ("articles or instruments of immoral use," such as devices, appliances, apparatuses, drugs); obscene information (any material containing obscene language or images, including information on how to obtain supplies); and laws specifically outlawing information or actions related to "procuring a miscarriage" (abortion). For each law, it is noted how what share of possible activities it restricted: importing; sale; advertisement; distribution (including circulating or printing information); verbal communication (including "uttering" or giving oral information); using the postal service; possession; possession with intent to sell or distribute; or singing. Each law's severity was also recorded: whether the offense was classified as a misdemeanor or a felony (or left unclassified), as well as the punishment, if specified.
Exemptions include coding for each law whether it contained a clause indicating that it did not apply to the following: scientific or medical works or books; medical colleges; practitioners of medicine (which could refer to physicians, nurses, druggists, midwives, etc.); artists and works of art; or activities for saving the life of the mother.
Fertility rates
Fertility behavior is observed at the level of state and decade. Ideally, to test the effect of the introduction of laws on childbearing behavior, there would be individual birth cohort data by year, i.e., the number of children born in each state in 1850, in 1851, etc. Cohort size could then be predicted using an indicator for whether there was a law in place in that state in the year before that cohort was born, when abortion policy would Because only the entire number of children born over the ten years prior to each Census (i.e., those aged 0 to 9) is observable, the relationship between a law passed in a given year and the number of children born the next year cannot be identified. To capture the fact that a law passed between Censuses affected only those pregnancies that began afterward, a measure of for how much of a decade there was a valid law in place is defined. This measure captures the share of the decade for which the law was relevant to childbearing. This variable is lagged one year, because abortions in year 0 cause a change in births in year 1.
For a law to be relevant to the cohorts of children aged 0 to 9 in 1880, the law must have been passed in the period 1870-1879. A law passed in 1876 was relevant to those children born in 1877, 1878, and 1879-that is, it was relevant for roughly 30% of the children who were aged 0 to 9 in 1880. Therefore such a law is coded as 0. The empirical specification is as follows:
(1)
where F ds represents alternative measures of ten-year fertility in decade d in state s, and havelaw ds is a continuous indicator variable ranging in value from 0 to 1 that reflects the share of the decade for which a state has a law restricting abortion. State-specific (δ s ) and decade-specific (δ d ) fixed effects are included to capture longstanding differences in fertility patterns across states over time as well as aggregate patterns of changing fertility preferences over time. In some specifications I also allow the state-specific differences to trend over time by including an interaction between δ s and decade d. In some specifications, I include d 2 *δ s, the square of the state-specific time trend. The main specification is weighted by total population, other specification checks were weighted by women age 15-44 or were given no weights. The coefficient β 1 measures the difference in ten-year fertility between states for which a law was in effect for the entire decade (havelaw ds =1) and states for which a law was never in effect in that decade (havelaw ds =0). In some specifications F ds is measured as the level of the child:woman ratio, and in others as the log of that ratio. When using the ratio itself, β 1 represents an estimate of the change in the number of children born per woman; when using the logged ratio, β 1 represents the percent change in childbearing.
Results
The results of OLS estimates of equation (1) are shown in Table 1 . Log and level regressions give similar results. Estimates suggest that laws restricting abortion led to an increase of between 95 and 116 children born over a decade per 1000 women, or a 8% to 11% increase in the number of children per woman from a base of about 1100 on average. These results statistically significant at conventional levels in most specifications, depending on decisions about weighting. The preferred specification is that in column (6), with a full set of state and year fixed effects and state trends, suggesting a 10% increase. Including state-specific time trends generally increases the estimated strength and significance of the relationship between legal restrictions and birth rates, suggesting that it is important to include controls for secular trends.
The bottom panel of Table 1 displays estimates of the effect on the birthrate of having had a law in place for at least two years. This specification tests for the possibility that laws took time to affect birthrates, especially in the 19 th century when information about legal changes may have moved more slowly. However, the relationships in this specification are slightly smaller, suggesting that lagging the laws introduces measurement error. Therefore, childbearing patterns changed quickly in reaction to laws. Table 1b estimates the overall affect of these laws on the population of the United
States. Unlike Table 1a , which tests the effect of the natural experiment, Table 1b includes weights by total population, giving more power to the actions of larger states.
The point estimates for these results are somewhat smaller and less significant, particularly when state trends are included in the estimation. These results suggest that the laws increased the national child/woman ratio by 2 to 10%. Table 2 tests the different aspects of these laws that may have strengthened or weakened the effects of the laws. The effect of a medical exemption is not significant and does not seem to substantively change the effect of having an abortion law on fertility, although the sign of the exemption is as would be predicted. Controlling for laws that allow for a crime to be committed only if the fetus dies strengthens the impact of the have law variable. With this exception, a woman can seek an abortion without being prosecuted. Since early abortions with abortifacients are difficult to detect as abortions, the law essentially allows early abortions prior to quickening as had been allowed by common law. Disallowing any information about abortions to be spread increases the fertility rate but controlling for this provision slightly decreases the magnitude of the have law variable. Finally, penalties for abortion seem to have no impact on the law; this lack could be because judges and juries were generally sympathetic to abortion cases in terms of finding fault and sentencing, but the true penalty for those accused came from the publicity associated with the trial (Reagan 1991) .
If, rather than childbearing patterns changing in reaction to laws, in fact the passage of laws reflected legislative reaction to changes in childbearing, then these estimates could not be interpreted as the effects of changes in access to fertility control.
The falsification check shown in Table 3 tests for this possibility; I attempt to predict the passage of a law in the next decade using the child:woman ratio in the current decade.
These tests find no consistent or statistically significant relationship between fertility and subsequent passage of a law in any specification. There is also no evidence for an effect of the percent immigrant, the female-male ratio, or the percent of the population lost in the Civil War on the probability that a law was passed in the next decade. Table 4 provides additional specification checks. Results are smaller when weighted by either total population in each cell as in column (1) (7) and (8).
Laws restricting abortion are positively correlated (correlation is .47) with those restricting birth control. 8 Putting the two together as in Table 5 , controlling for birth control laws does not seem to change the effect of having an abortion law. Different methods of measuring birth control laws also do not seem to affect the effect of an abortion law.
There may also be some question as to whether the effects are caused by the denominator, with increased female mortality caused by these laws, rather than the numerator, number of children born. Regressions on just the numerator or just the denominator suggest that increased female mortality is unlikely to be the cause. Abortion laws increase children age 0-9 by 42%. There is no significant effect on women, and in most specifications, the impact of laws on women is small and positive.
Discussion and Conclusion
These estimates are highly consistent with research on recent (1970s-era) changes in legal access to abortion and birth control, which find effects from 5% for the overall population to 15% for groups that are particularly likely to want to decrease childbearing (e.g. poor women, teenagers) (Ananat and Hungerman 2006, Levine et al. 1999 
